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A Consistent Firm Objective When Markets are
Incomplete: Profit Maximization
Abstract
In economies with private firm ownership, when markets are incomplete, and firm sharehold-
ers change over time, there is no broad agreement on what ought to be a firm’s objective. It
is shown that ex-post, profit maximization is consistent with shareholder preferences in such
economies; that is, along the equilibrium path, in every period and state of the world, every
coalition of a firm’s shareholders in that period and state approves a profit-maximizing pro-
duction plan. This result is shown using natural assumptions about shareholder preferences
and shareholder control, and it applies to cases when shareholders within a firm and across
firms can form coalitions, and when stock trading can be ex-dividend or cum-dividend, and
with a combination of both. This result can help provide a foundation for formulating a
theory of the firm when markets are incomplete; a theory based on primitives of shareholder
preferences and shareholder control that are to be necessarily satisfied in economies with
private firm ownership.
1 Introduction
A theory of the firm in economies with incomplete markets is not yet well-established, partly
because there is no broad agreement on some basic questions, such as what ought to be a
firm’s objective when markets are incomplete. In the standard Arrow-Debreu model with
complete markets, a firm’s objective is to maximize profits, and a firm’s shareholders unani-
mously support this objective, essentially because it leads to a maximal budget set for each
of them. When markets are incomplete, and there is trade over time, both in spot and
stock markets, a firm’s shareholders can change over time, and as different shareholders in
different periods can have different preferences, it is not known what firm objective, as an
equilibrium concept, can survive potential conflicts with changing shareholder preferences.
Providing a consistent firm objective when markets are incomplete is an important step in
understanding the design and organization of productive resources in a private ownership
economy with incomplete markets, especially because a complete set of markets does not
exist in actual economies.2
This paper shows that profit maximization is consistent with shareholder preferences
even when markets are incomplete and shareholders are changing over time, in the sense
that ex-post, along the equilibrium path, in every time period and state of the world, every
coalition of a firm’s shareholders in that time period and state of the world approves a profit-
maximizing production plan.3 That is, in a sense made precise below, along the equilibrium
2Markets for commodities might not exist for several well-known reasons, including externalities, asym-
metric information, legal restrictions, technological limitations, set-up costs, and the extensive number of
markets required by the definition of an economic commodity.
3In particular, shareholders in every time period and state of the world unanimously approve a profit-
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path, no coalition of shareholders can improve on a profit-maximizing plan. The intuition
for this result is similar to the intuition for the result for Arrow-Debreu economies; that
is, a profit-maximizing production plan provides a maximal extension of every consumer-
shareholder’s budget set in each period and state in which a consumer-shareholder can affect
production choices, and therefore, if a consumer-shareholder is optimizing over such a bud-
get set, another production plan cannot improve upon this outcome. The analysis here
deduces the consistency of profit-maximization by incorporating some basic implications of
a relatively realistic process of shareholder control, by deriving shareholder preferences for
production plans from more primitive consumer preferences, and by evaluating different pro-
duction plans using such shareholder preferences along any path that might be realized in
equilibrium. The result presented here applies to decentralized, private ownership economies
with anonymous stock market trade over time, and with firm ownership separate from con-
trol.
Previous work in the theory of incomplete markets has postulated several firm objectives,
including firm utility maximization, and different forms of firm market value maximization,
and there has been some discussion of how these objectives relate to a firm’s shareholders,
but such firm objectives have not been formally shown to satisfy some primitive shareholder
preferences for production plans.4 For example, in the seminal paper by Radner (1972) on
incomplete markets and sequential trade, an explicit continuous and strictly concave (but
otherwise arbitrary) utility function is postulated for each firm in an economy, and a firm’s
maximizing production plan.
4A notable exception is the model by Ekern and Wilson (1974), and as described in Radner (1974), their
model can be formulated as a model with complete markets.
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objective is to choose a production plan to maximize firm utility, but it is not shown if this
firm utility is consistent with the preferences of some, or all, or none of a firm’s shareholders,
and the problem is made more complex when firm shareholders are changing over time.
Drèze (1974), in a two-period model, has postulated a firm objective of maximizing
firm value, with firm value defined as the present value of firm profits, and with present
value computed using an average of the marginal rates of inter-temporal substitution of firm
shareholders in the second period; that is, using the average present value coefficients of final
shareholders. As mentioned in Geanakoplos, Magill, Quinzii, and Drèze (1990), this approach
has the advantage of being the only criterion which satisfies the first-order conditions of
constrained Pareto optimality (as defined in their paper), and as mentioned in Grossman
and Hart (1979), there can be a problem in extending this approach to economies with more
than two periods, (but confer Bonnisseau and Lachiri (2003) for one such extension.)
Grossman and Hart (1979), in a multi-period model, have postulated the same objective
for the firm as has Drèze, but with present value computed using an average of the marginal
rates of substitution of firm shareholders in the first period; that is, using the average present
value coefficients of the original shareholders. This approach has the advantage of being
applicable in a multi-period model, but as mentioned in Geanakoplos, Magill, Quinzii, and
Drèze (1990), a focus on original shareholders is reasonable only if future shareholders cannot
reverse production plans. This condition appears to be formalized by Grossman and Hart
in their postulate of utility-taking behavior, a concept described in their paper as “each
consumer anticipates that when a firm alters its production plan, his utility will not change
as a result of capital gains and losses per se, expect to the extent that the consumer is an
initial shareholder of the firm.”
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In the papers mentioned above, a motivation for considering alternative firm objectives
originates from a recognition that if firm choices are contrary to shareholder preferences, then
managers who control firm operations (such as a board of directors or senior managers) can
be replaced by firm shareholders. Concepts of maximizing present value of firm profits are
motivated by comparison to the case of complete markets, where initial and final shareholders
are the same, where each consumer-shareholder’s preferences for production are summarized
by her marginal rates of substitution between income now and income in different states
in the future, and the collection of these marginal rates of substitution is equalized across
consumer-shareholders in equilibrium, and therefore, a firm objective of maximizing present
value of profits can be unambiguously defined in terms of these rates, and is consistent
with the preferences of each consumer-shareholder. When markets are incomplete, these
rates are usually not equalized, and therefore, marginal rates of substitution for different
consumer-shareholders yield different present values for firm profits, maximizing different
present values can be consistent with the objectives of some shareholders and inconsistent
with that of others, and consequently, shareholders have an incentive to block production
plans inconsistent with their preferences. It is not clear what firm objective survives a
potential shareholder blocking. Against this backdrop, a firm objective of market value
maximization postulated by Drèze (1974) and Grossman and Hart (1979) can be rationalized
by explaining that each version of present value of firm profits is well-defined, and each version
can be possibly expected to survive shareholder blocking by an average shareholder.
This paper explicitly tries to understand and incorporate some basic implications of
the process by which shareholders can affect firm decisions. In an economy with private
firm ownership and anonymous stock market trade over time, firm shareholders cannot be
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assumed to know the identities of other shareholders, ex-ante. At most, shareholders in a
particular period can be assumed, ex-post, to know the identities of other shareholders in that
period, perhaps in a shareholder meeting for that period. Moreover, firm shareholders in a
particular period can affect firm decisions in that period, (by voting to remove management,
if necessary,) they can block a production plan inconsistent with their preferences even if such
a plan is preferred by (possibly different) shareholders in a different period, and therefore,
for a particular production plan to satisfy a consistent firm objective, whether the plan
is based on some average preferences of either initial shareholders, or final shareholders,
or shareholders in some other period, such a plan should survive shareholder blocking in
every period (more generally, every node).5 Finally, although shareholders in a particular
shareholder meeting can approve or block production plans, shareholders can change over
time, and therefore, shareholder preferences for production plans can change over time,
and as future shareholders can affect future production choices, shareholders in a particular
period cannot automatically assume that a firm manager implements a future production
plan consistent with existing shareholder preferences. They can, at most, credibly affect the
choice of a production plan at a node at which they are firm shareholders.
The result in this paper can be viewed as an ex-post evaluation of the consistency of profit-
maximization, as compared to an ex-ante evaluation implicit in previous work. Consider a
standard two-period, Radner-GEI economy with incomplete markets, with finitely many
5Notice that even at a particular node, it is not necessary that shareholders composing a particular
average unanimously agree with a plan that maximizes present value based on such an average, and indeed,
with some variation in shareholder preferences, such a production plan would not be unanimously approved
by these shareholders.
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states of the world in the second period, finitely many commodities in each period and state,
finitely many firms, and finitely many consumer-shareholders. The process of shareholder
control posited here assumes that shareholders in period 1 (that is, original shareholders)
can vote on the production plan for period 1, and regardless of which state s is realized,
shareholders in period 2 (that is, final shareholders, determined after period 1 stock market
trade) can vote on the production plan for period 2, state s. Previous results about differing
shareholder preferences arise if, as in Drèze (1974), period 2 shareholders (or equivalently,
final shareholders, or equivalently, end-of-period 1 shareholders) can implement in period 1 a
production plan for period 2, or if, as in Grossman and Hart (1979), period 1 shareholders (or
equivalently, original shareholders) can implement in period 1 a production plan for period
2. This is possible, if shareholders implement firm decisions, but this cannot automatically
be assumed if firm decisions are implemented by managers who might be accountable to
different future shareholders. In such a case, it is shown that if firms maximize profits,
then ex-post, regardless of which state s is realized, no coalition of period 1 shareholders
opposes this firm objective, and no coalition of period 2 shareholders opposes this objective.
Intuitively, if a collection of entrepreneurs know each other and run a firm themselves, (that
is, if they know each other and can commit to remain owners in the future,) then there can
be differences among them about which plan to follow, based on their equilibrium inter-
temporal rates of substitution, but if shareholders are separate from managerial control, and
present shareholders do not know the identity of future shareholders, and therefore cannot
credibly affect future plans, then it is in all shareholders’ best interest that firm managers
maximize profits.
Profit maximization as a firm objective has several well-known and appealing features
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when markets are complete; it is unanimously supported by a firm’s shareholders, it allows
for a separation of ownership and control, thereby facilitating the anonymity and smooth op-
eration of decentralized markets, and it does not require a firm manager to possess more ana-
lytical ability than a consumer-shareholder.6 These features are more desirable in economies
with incomplete markets, because with profit maximization as a firm objective, firm produc-
tion over time can be consistently organized even when firm shareholders are changing over
time. In particular, profit maximization does not impose additional informational require-
ments that arise when firms maximize present value based on shareholder inter-temporal
rates of substitution; that is, with separation of ownership and control, and with a firm
objective of value maximization, in addition to requirements for profit maximization, a firm
is required to correctly predict both the identity of its equilibrium shareholders as well as
their equilibrium inter-temporal rates of substitution.
It is noteworthy that this paper does not consider the problem of efficiency of equilibrium
allocations when markets are incomplete. As is well-known, when markets are incomplete,
competitive equilibria and stock market equilibria might fail to be Pareto efficient (Hart
(1975), Stiglitz (1982)). Moreover, with particular definitions of constrained efficiency, com-
petitive equilibria can be constrained Pareto efficient (Diamond (1967)), can fail to be con-
strained Pareto efficient (Dierker, Dierker, and Grodal (2002)), can generically fail to be
constrained Pareto efficient (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), Geanakoplos, Magill,
Quinzii, and Drèze (1990)), and in a fairly weak sense of constrained efficiency, are Allais-
6In maximizing profits, firm expectations about prices and firm ability regarding optimization are the
same as those required of a consumer. This provides conceptual cohesiveness, because firm decisions are
taken by a consumer providing services for managing a firm.
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Malinvaud efficient (Sabarwal (2003)). Moreover, this paper focuses on competitive markets.
Analysis of firm objectives under oligopolistic markets is presented in Dierker and Grodal
(1996), and in Dierker and Grodal (1999).
The next section shows the consistency of profit maximization as a firm objective when
markets are incomplete. This is formally shown in the context of Radner-GEI economies,
and with natural assumptions about shareholder preferences and shareholder control. The
section after that presents some extensions of this basic result, and the last section concludes.
2 Profit Maximization as a Firm Objective
The seminal paper by Radner (1972) formalizes a model of an economy in which markets
are incomplete in the sense that in each period and state of the world, all commodities for
delivery in that period and state of the world can be traded, but some commodites for future
delivery cannot be traded. In such an economy there are finitely many consumers, firms, and
commodities. Firms are privately owned by consumer-shareholders, and shares of firms are
traded in stock markets. In each period and state, a consumer-shareholder can trade only in
commodities and firm shares for which markets exist in that period and state. Consumers
use firm shares to move income among different time periods, and among different states
of the world to finance a consumption plan that they desire most. Radner’s model of an
economy, and some of its extensions are also referred to as a model of general equilibrium
with incomplete markets (GEI model). Such an economy is formalized below.7
7Additional details about such economies are given in Grossman and Hart (1979), and in Magill and
Quinzii (1996).
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A Radner-GEI economy is formalized as follows. Trade takes place over time, and there is
uncertainty. Economic activity takes place over a finite number of elementary time periods,
indexed t = 1, . . . , T , and a finite number of states of the world, indexed s = 1, . . . , S. Each
state s is a particular history of the environment from period 1 through period T . The events
observable in period t are given by a partition St of {1, . . . , S}. To reflect dependence of
actions in period t on events observable in that period, a function on {1, . . . , S} is said to be
St-measurable if it is constant on each event Et ∈ St. To reflect the additional availability
of information as time goes on, the sequence of partitions, S = (St)Tt=1, is taken to be
nondecreasing in fineness, and it is termed an information structure. For t = 1, . . . , T , let
Rt =
{
(ξt(s))
S
s=1 ∈ <S |ξt(·) is St-measurable
}
be the subspace of <S consisting of vectors
which are St-measurable and let R =
T×
t=1
Rt.
There are a finite number of privately-owned firms, indexed j = 1, . . . , J , a finite number
of consumer-shareholders, indexed i = 1, . . . , I, and in each period t, state s, a finite number
of commodities, indexed ` = 1, . . . , L.
The production technology for firm j is Y j ⊂ T×
t=1
RLt . A production plan for firm j is
an element yj = (yjt )
T
t=1 ∈ Y j, and it entails an input-output (or netput) of yjt (s)` units of
good ` in period t, state s.8 A production profile is a collection y = (yj)Jj=1 where for each
j, yj is a production plan for firm j. When convenient, yjt (s) denotes a production plan
for firm j in period t, state s, and (yjt (s))
J
j=1 denotes a production profile in period t, state
s. As usual, each Y j is closed, convex, includes the possibility of inaction, 0 ∈ Y j, and
satisfies free disposal, Y j ⊃
(
− T×
t=1
(RLt )+
)
. Moreover, as usual, there is no aggregate free
8As usual, negative entries in a production plan are inputs, and positive entries are outputs.
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lunch,
(∑
j Y
j
)
∩
(
T×
t=1
(RLt )+
)
= {0}, and there is aggregate irreversibility of production,
(∑
j Y
j
)
∩
(
−∑j Y j
)
= {0}.
Each firm is privately owned by consumer-shareholders. Firm ownership provides a share-
holder a claim on firm profits proportional to her firm shareholding, and firm ownership can
be traded in stock markets. Therefore, both a consumer-shareholder’s shareholding, and a
firm’s shareholders can change over time. The shareholding space in period t ≤ T − 1 is
Θt =
{
θt ∈ RJt | 0 ≤ θt ≤ 1
}
, that in period t = T is ΘT = {0} ⊂ RJT , and the shareholding
space is Θ =
T×
t=1
Θt. A shareholding plan for consumer-shareholder i is denoted θ
i, it is an
element of Θ, and it entails holding a θi,jt (s) share of firm j in period t, state s. The share-
holding profile space in period t ≤ T − 1 is Θ∆t =
{
θt ∈ ΘIt
∣∣for every j, s, ∑i θi,jt (s) = 1
}
,
that in period t = T is Θ∆T = Θ
I
T , and the shareholding profile space is Θ
∆ =
T×
t=1
Θ∆t . A
shareholding profile is an element of the shareholding profile space, it is denoted θ = (θi)Ii=1,
where θi,jt (s) is the shareholding of consumer-shareholder i in firm j in period t, state s.
The consumption space in period t is Xt = (RLt )+, and the consumption space is X =
T×
t=1
Xt. A consumption plan for consumer-shareholder i is an element x
i = (xit)
T
t=1 ∈ X, and
it entails consumption of xit(s)` units of good ` in period t, state s. A consumption profile is
a collection x = (xi)Ii=1 where for each i, x
i is a consumption plan for consumer-shareholder
i. When convenient, xit(s) denotes a consumption plan for consumer-shareholder i in period
t, state s, and (xit(s))
I
i=1 denotes a consumption profile in period t, state s. Each consumer-
shareholder i has a preference relation ( ºi ⊂ X ×X) that is complete, reflexive, transitive,
convex, continuous, and strongly monotone (x > x́ ⇒ x Âi x́.)9 Each consumer-shareholder
9The notions of indifference (∼i) and strict preference (Âi) are the usual ones.
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i has a consumption endowment wi = (wit)
T
t=1 ∈ X, and a shareholding endowment θi0 ∈ Θ1,
such that the collection of consumption endowments satisfies inf i w
i À 0, and the collection
of shareholding endowments satisfies θ0 = (θ
i
0)
I
i=1 ∈ Θ∆1 .
Prices of commodities and firms are defined as follows. The price space in period t ≤
T − 1 is ∆t =
{
(pt, qt) ∈ (RL+Jt )+
∣∣∣ for every s, ∑` pt(s)` +
∑
j qt(s)j = 1
}
, and that in
period t = T is ∆T =
{
(pT , 0) ∈ (RL+JT )+ | for every s,
∑
` pT (s)` = 1
}
. The price space is
∆ =
T×
t=1
∆t. A price system is an element (p, q) ∈ ∆, with pt(s)` the price of a unit of good
` in period t, state s, and qt(s)j the price of firm j in period t, state s.
For a price system (p, q), and a production plan yj for firm j, the profit to firm j in
period t, state s is pt(s)y
j
t (s), and the profit to firm j is py
j =
∑
s,t pt(s)y
j
t (s). A production
plan yj maximizes profits over Y j if pyj = max
ýj∈Y j
pýj.
For a price system (p, q), a production profile y = (yj)Jj=1, and a consumption-shareholding
plan (xi, θi) for consumer-shareholder i, the disposable income of i in period t, state s is
W i(p, q, y)t(s) = pt(s)w
i
t(s) + qt(s)θ
i
t−1(s) +
∑
j
θi,jt−1(s)pt(s)y
j
t (s).
A consumption-shareholding plan (xi, θi) is (p, q, y)-affordable for consumer-shareholder i,
if in every period t, state s, pt(s)x
i
t(s) + qt(s)θ
i
t(s) ≤ W i(p, q, y)t(s).10 A consumer-
shareholder’s budget set consists of all consumption and shareholding plans that are af-
10Notice that as in Radner (1972), and in Drèze (1974) and Grossman and Hart (1979), a θi,jt−1(s) share-
holding by consumer-shareholder i in firm j in period t − 1, state s provides her with a θi,jt−1(s) share of
profits of firm j in period t, state s, (and she continues to receive a share of profits in future periods to the
extent that she continues shareholding in this firm.) This implies, of course, that profits in each period are
distributed to shareholders as dividends. Moreover, this is consistent with ex-dividend stock trading. The
results here remain true with cum-dividend stock trading, as explained in the next section.
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fordable, and her demand set consists of those plans in the budget set that are optimal
with respect to her preference relation. Formally, for a price system (p, q), and a production
profile y = (yj)Jj=1, the budget set for consumer-shareholder i is
Bi(p, q, y) =
{
(xi, θi) ∈ X ×Θ ∣∣(xi, θi) is (p, q, y)-affordable } ,
and the demand set for consumer i is
Di(p, q, y) =
{
(xi, θi) ∈ Bi(p, q, y)
∣∣∣(x́i, θ́i) ∈ Bi(p, q, y) ⇒ xi ºi x́i
}
.
A Radner-GEI economy is a collection
{S, (Y j)Jj=1, (ºi, wi, θi0)Ii=1
}
,
where S = (St)Tt=1 is an information structure, Y j is a production technology for firm j, and
(ºi, wi, θi0) is the preference relation and consumption-shareholding endowment of consumer-
shareholder i. ARadner equilibrium is a collection (p, q; y = (yj)Jj=1; (x
i, θi)Ii=1), where
(p, q) is a price system, for every j, yj maximizes profits over Y j, for every i, (xi, θi) ∈
Di(p, q, y),
∑I
i=1 x
i =
∑I
i=1 w
i +
∑J
j=1 y
j, and θ = (θi)Ii=1 ∈ Θ∆. In other words, a Radner
equilibrium is a collection of prices, one set for each period and state when markets for
trade are open, a production profile, and a consumption and shareholding profile, such that
firms are maximizing profits, consumers are maximizing preferences, and in every period
and state, all consumption markets are clearing, and all firm shares are held by consumer-
shareholders.11 When convenient, a consumption and production profile ((xi)Ii=1, (y
j)Jj=1) is
11For existence of equilibrium with bounds on short sales, see Radner (1972), and Grossman and Hart
(1979), and for generic existence of equilibrium without bounds on short sales, see Duffie and Shafer (1985),
and Duffie and Shafer (1986).
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an allocation if
∑I
i=1 x
i =
∑I
i=1 w
i +
∑J
j=1 y
j, and a consumption and production profile
((xit(s))
I
i=1, (y
j
t (s))
J
j=1) in period t, state s is an allocation in period t, state s, if
∑I
i=1 x
i
t(s) =
∑I
i=1 w
i
t(s) +
∑J
j=1 y
j
t (s). With this terminology, a consumption and production profile
((xi)Ii=1, (y
j)Jj=1) in a Radner equilibrium is an allocation, and consequently, it is an allocation
in every period t, state s.
The main result in this paper is that in economies with private firm ownership, when
markets are incomplete, and firm shareholders can change over time, profit maximization re-
mains, ex-post, a firm objective consistent with shareholder preferences. The formal analysis
includes postulating shareholder control over firm decisions, deriving shareholder preferences
for production plans from consumer preferences, and showing that along the equilibrium
path in a Radner equilibrium, no coalition of shareholders wants to deviate from a profit-
maximizing production plan. Details are as follows.
As mentioned above, in an economy with private firm ownership, a firm’s production
choice needs to be somewhat aligned with shareholder preferences, and with trade over
time in stock markets, any such alignment is made more complex, because shareholders
of a firm can change over time, and therefore, shareholder preferences for production can
change over time. To see that a profit-maximizing production plan can be aligned with
shareholder preferences, it is important, as a first step, to understand the process by which
shareholders might be able to exercise control over firm decisions, and to formalize an idea
of when a production plan might be preferred by a coalition of consumer-shareholders. With
anonymous trading in stock markets, shareholders in a given period cannot be assumed to
know the identities of other shareholders, except possibly when they interact with other
shareholders in a shareholder meeting. In this sense, exercise of shareholder control in a
13
given period (and state) is limited, at most, to shareholders in that period (and state).
Moreover, as future firm shareholders can affect future firm choices, existing shareholders
can be credibly assumed only to affect the firm’s current period production plan. Therefore,
to formalize the concept of shareholder control, it is assumed that (1) there is a shareholder
meeting in every period (and state), and at this meeting, firm shareholders in that period
(and state) can form voting coalitions and vote on a firm’s future production plan, (2)
a shareholder in a given period (and state) does not know if another consumer will be a
shareholder in a different period (or state), (3) a single future shareholder cannot affect
a firm’s future production plan, and consequently, (4) shareholders in a given period can
credibly affect only the firm’s current period production plan.
Shareholder control is exercised as follows. For expositional clarity, suppose, in this
paragraph, that there is no uncertainty. As mentioned above, for a period t̂ = 1, . . . , T , a
θi,j
t̂−1 shareholding by consumer-shareholder i in firm j provides her with a θ
i,j
t̂−1 share of firm
j profits in period t̂. This is consistent with ex-dividend stock trading; that is, a seller of
firm share in period t̂− 1 keeps her share of firm profits for period t̂− 1, and a buyer of firm
share in period t̂− 1 receives a share of firm profits for period t̂. To aid interpretation, this
can be viewed as stock market trade at the end of a period. At the beginning of each period
t̂, there is a shareholder meeting of existing shareholders; that is, shareholders who bought
firm shares at the end of period t̂− 1. These shareholders are termed period t̂ shareholders.
At this meeting, managers of firm ĵ present period t̂ shareholders the production results for
period t̂ − 1, and their current and future production plan, denoted (yĵ)T
t=t̂
. Intuitively, a
subset of period t̂ shareholders prefers a feasible production plan ýĵ
t̂
to production plan yĵ
t̂
,
if they can re-distribute among themselves their period t̂ endowments and production plan
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ýĵ
t̂
to get new consumption plans for period t̂ so that when compared to the consumption
plan each could have achieved with her period t̂ endowment and her share of profits from
production plan yĵ
t̂
, no shareholder in this subset is made worse off with her new consumption
plan, some shareholder in this subset is made strictly better off, and shareholders not in this
subset are unaffected. For a subset of shareholders to approve production plan yĵ
t̂
, it must be
that there is no production plan ýĵ
t̂
that this subset of shareholders prefers to yĵ
t̂
. These ideas
are formalized in the following concepts about the consumption preferences of a consumer-
shareholder in a given period, and the production preferences of subsets of shareholders, and
it is shown that when yj = (yjt )
T
t=1 maximizes profits overY
j, every subset of shareholders in
every period approves this plan.12
The idea of making a consumer-shareholder better off in a given period and state can
be motivated by considering a consumer-shareholder i with preference relation ºi, and a
consumption plan xi, and naturally deriving a preference for consumption in a given period
and state as follows. In a particular period t, state s, consumer-shareholder i prefers a
bundle of commodities x́it(s) to x
i
t(s), if she prefers the consumption plan that is derived
from xi by replacing xit(s) with x́
i
t(s) to the consumption plan x
i. More formally, let xi be
a consumption plan for consumer-shareholder i, and let ºi be the preference of consumer-
12Notice that the results presented here do not depend on the particular timing of shareholder meetings and
stock trade mentioned above. For stock market trade as in Radner (1974), the only interpretive requirement
would be that a shareholder meeting is held at least an instant before stock trade, so that shareholders who
are to receive profits in a period are the ones voting on firm plans for that period. Conditional on this
requirement, shareholder meeting and stock trade can be held at any time during a period. In particular,
this applies for an elementary time period, which is also viewed as a node. Similar interpretations naturally
hold for cum-dividend stock trading.
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shareholder i. If x́i
t̂
(ŝ) is a consumption plan for consumer-shareholder i in period t̂, state
ŝ, then consumer-shareholder i prefers x́i
t̂
(ŝ) to xi
t̂
(ŝ) in period t̂, state ŝ, denoted
x́i
t̂
(ŝ) ºi
t̂
(ŝ) xi
t̂
(ŝ), if x̂i ºi xi, where x̂i is defined as follows: x̂it(s) = x́it(s) if t = t̂ and s =
ŝ, and x̂it(s) = x
i
t(s) otherwise, and consumer-shareholder i strictly prefers x́
i
t̂
(ŝ) to
xi
t̂
(ŝ) in period t̂, state ŝ, denoted x́i
t̂
(ŝ) Âi
t̂
(ŝ) xi
t̂
(ŝ), if x̂i Âi xi. Let ºi be the preference
of consumer-shareholder i, and let xi be a consumption plan for consumer-shareholder i. The
preference ºit (s) is weakly monotone in period t, state s, if for every consumption plan x́i,
x́it(s) À xit(s) ⇒ x́it(s) Âit (s) xit(s). Notice that if ºi is strongly monotone, then ºit (s)
is weakly monotone in period t, state s, for every period t, state s. Moreover, if ºit (s) is
weakly monotone in period t, state s, for every period t, state s, then ºi is weakly monotone.
Production preferences of subsets of shareholders are formalized as follows. Let y =
(yj)Jj=1 be a production profile, and (x
i, θi)Ii=1 be a consumption and shareholding profile.
A consumer i is a shareholder of firm j in period t, state s if θi,jt−1(s) > 0. For each firm
j, period t, state s, let Sjt (s) =
{
i
∣∣θi,jt−1(s) > 0
}
be the collection of shareholders of firm j
in period t, state s. A firm j coalition in period t, state s, denoted Cjt (s), is a non-
empty subset of Sjt (s). Let C
ĵ
t̂
(ŝ) be a firm ĵ coalition in period t̂, state ŝ, let ýĵ
t̂
(ŝ) be a
production plan for firm ĵ in period t̂, state ŝ, and define C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ) prefers ýĵ
t̂
(ŝ) to yĵ
t̂
(ŝ), if
the production plan ýĵ formed by setting ýĵt (s) = ý
ĵ
t̂
(ŝ) if t = t̂, and s = ŝ, and ýĵt (s) = y
ĵ
t (s)
otherwise, is feasible, (that is, ýĵ ∈ Y ĵ,) and for every consumer-shareholder i ∈ C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ), there
is a consumption plan x́i
t̂
(ŝ) in period t̂, state ŝ such that the production profile (ýj
t̂
(ŝ))Jj=1
in period t̂, state ŝ formed by setting ýj
t̂
(ŝ) = ýĵ
t̂
(ŝ) if j = ĵ, and ýj
t̂
(ŝ) = yj
t̂
(ŝ) otherwise,
and the consumption profile (x́i
t̂
(ŝ))Ii=1 in period t̂, state ŝ formed by setting x́
i
t̂
(ŝ) = x́i
t̂
(ŝ) if
i ∈ C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ), and x́i
t̂
(ŝ) = xi
t̂
(ŝ) otherwise, together form an allocation in period t̂, state ŝ, (that
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is,
∑I
i=1 x́
i
t̂
(ŝ) =
∑I
i=1 w
i
t̂
(ŝ) +
∑J
j=1 ý
j
t̂
(ŝ),) and for every consumer-shareholder i ∈ C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ),
x́i
t̂
(ŝ) ºi
t̂
(ŝ) xi
t̂
(ŝ), and for some consumer-shareholder i ∈ C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ), x́i
t̂
(ŝ) Âi
t̂
(ŝ) xi
t̂
(ŝ). The
first condition ensures that a candidate for a preferred production plan is feasible, the second
condition ensures that if the initial production and consumption profiles form an allocation in
a given period and state, then the candidate production and consumption profiles remain an
allocation in that period and state, and therefore, the candidate consumption and production
profiles form a re-distribution that affects at most the shareholders of a particular firm that
are in a coalition, and the third condition ensures that nobody in the coalition is made worse
off, and someone is made strictly better off. For a firm j coalition in period t, state s, Cjt (s),
a production plan yj is Cjt (s)-proof if there is no ý
j
t (s) such that C
j
t (s)-prefers ý
j
t (s) to
yjt (s). A production plan y
j is coalition proof if for every period t, state s, and for every
firm j coalition in period t, state s, Cjt (s), y
j is Cjt (s)-proof.
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The corollary following the lemma and theorem below formalizes the role of profit max-
imization as a firm objective consistent with shareholder preferences when markets are in-
complete and firm shareholders are changing over time.
Lemma. Let (p, q) be a price system, y = (yj)Jj=1 be a production profile, (x
i, θi) ∈ Di(p, q, y),
and x́i be another consumption plan for i. In period t̂, state ŝ,
if x́i
t̂
(ŝ) ºi
t̂
(ŝ) xi
t̂
(ŝ), then pt̂(ŝ)x́
i
t̂
(ŝ) + qt̂(ŝ)θ
i
t̂
(ŝ) ≥ W i(p, q, y)t̂(ŝ), and
if x́i
t̂
(ŝ) Âi
t̂
(ŝ) xi
t̂
(ŝ), then pt̂(ŝ)x́
i
t̂
(ŝ) + qt̂(ŝ)θ
i
t̂
(ŝ) > W i(p, q, y)t̂(ŝ).
Proof. To prove the first statement, suppose its hypothesis is true, and suppose that
pt̂(ŝ)x́
i
t̂
(ŝ) + qt̂(ŝ)θ
i
t̂
(ŝ) < W i(p, q, y)t̂(ŝ). Then there is x̂
i
t̂
(ŝ) À x́i
t̂
(ŝ) such that pt̂(ŝ)x̂
i
t̂
(ŝ) +
13Notice that definitions regarding coalitions include shareholders of a particular firm. This can be weak-
ened to allow for coalitions of shareholders across firms, as explained in the next section.
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qt̂(ŝ)θ
i
t̂
(ŝ) ≤ W i(p, q, y)t̂(ŝ). Therefore, if the consumption plan x̂i is defined as x̂it(s) =
x̂i
t̂
(ŝ) if t = t̂ and s = ŝ, and x̂it(s) = x
i
t(s) otherwise, then (x̂
i, θi) ∈ Bi(p, q, y). Moreover,
if the consumption plan x̃i is defined as x̃it(s) = x́
i
t(s) if t = t̂ and s = ŝ, and x̃
i
t(s) =
xit(s) otherwise, then x̂
i
t̂
(ŝ) À x́i
t̂
(ŝ) implies x̂i Âi x̃i, and x́i
t̂
(ŝ) ºit (s) xit̂(ŝ) implies x̃i ºi xi.
Therefore, x̂i Âi xi, contradicting the optimality of xi.
To prove the second statement, suppose its hypothesis is true, and suppose that pt̂(ŝ)x́
i
t̂
(ŝ)+
qt̂(ŝ)θ
i
t̂
(ŝ) ≤ W i(p, q, y)t̂(ŝ). In this case, if the consumption plan x̃i is defined as x̃it(s) =
x́it(s) if t = t̂ and s = ŝ, and x̃
i
t(s) = x
i
t(s) otherwise, then (x̃
i, θi) ∈ Bi(p, q, y). Moreover,
x́i
t̂
(ŝ) Âi
t̂
(ŝ) xi
t̂
(ŝ) implies x̃i Âi xi, contradicting the optimality of xi.
Theorem. Let (p, q) be a price system, y = (yj)Jj=1 be a production profile, (x
i, θi)Ii=1 be a
consumption and shareholding profile, and for every i, (xi, θi) ∈ Di(p, q, y).
For every firm j, if yj maximizes profits over Y j, then yj is coalition proof.
Proof. Fix ĵ, suppose yĵ maximizes profits over Y ĵ, and suppose yĵ is not coalition proof.
Let t̂ be a period, ŝ be a state, C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ) be a firm ĵ coalition in period t̂, state ŝ, and ýĵ
t̂
(ŝ)
be a production plan for firm ĵ in period t̂, state ŝ such that C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ) prefers ýĵ
t̂
(ŝ) to yĵ
t̂
(ŝ).
For every consumer-shareholder i ∈ C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ), let x́i
t̂
(ŝ) be a consumption plan in period t̂,
state ŝ such that the production profile (ýj
t̂
(ŝ))Jj=1 in period t̂, state ŝ formed by setting
ýj
t̂
(ŝ) = ýĵ
t̂
(ŝ) if j = ĵ, and ýj
t̂
(ŝ) = yj
t̂
(ŝ) otherwise, and the consumption profile (x́i
t̂
(ŝ))Ii=1
in period t̂, state ŝ formed by setting x́i
t̂
(ŝ) = x́i
t̂
(ŝ) if i ∈ C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ), and x́i
t̂
(ŝ) = xi
t̂
(ŝ) otherwise,
together form an allocation in period t̂, state ŝ, (
∑I
i=1 x́
i
t̂
(ŝ) =
∑I
i=1 w
i
t̂
(ŝ) +
∑J
j=1 ý
j
t̂
(ŝ),)
and for every consumer-shareholder i ∈ C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ), x́i
t̂
(ŝ) ºi
t̂
(ŝ) xi
t̂
(ŝ), and for some consumer-
shareholder i ∈ C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ), x́i
t̂
(ŝ) Âi
t̂
(ŝ) xi
t̂
(ŝ). Then, by the lemma above, for every consumer-
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shareholder i ∈ C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ), pt̂(ŝ)x́
i
t̂
(ŝ) + qt̂(ŝ)θ
i
t̂
(ŝ) ≥ W i(p, q, y)t̂(ŝ), and for some consumer-
shareholder i ∈ C ĵ
t̂
(ŝ), pt̂(ŝ)x́
i
t̂
(ŝ) + qt̂(ŝ)θ
i
t̂
(ŝ) > W i(p, q, y)t̂(ŝ). Therefore,
∑
i pt̂(ŝ)w
i
t̂
(ŝ) +
∑
j pt̂(ŝ)ý
j
t̂
(ŝ) +
∑
i qt̂(ŝ)θ
i
t̂
(ŝ)
=
∑
i
(
pt̂(ŝ)x́
i
t̂
(ŝ) + qt̂(ŝ)θ
i
t̂
(ŝ)
)
>
∑
i W
i(p, q, y)t̂(ŝ)
=
∑
i
(
pt̂(ŝ)w
i
t̂
(ŝ) + qt̂(ŝ)θ
i
t̂−1(ŝ) +
∑
j θ
i,j
t̂−1(ŝ)pt̂(ŝ)y
j
t̂
(ŝ)
)
=
∑
i pt̂(ŝ)w
i
t̂
(ŝ) +
∑
i qt̂(ŝ)θ
i
t̂−1(ŝ) +
∑
j pt̂(ŝ)y
j
t̂
(ŝ),
whence pt̂(ŝ)ý
ĵ
t̂
(ŝ) > pt̂(ŝ)y
ĵ
t̂
(ŝ), and consequently,
∑
t,s pt(s)ý
ĵ
t (s) >
∑
t,s pt(s)y
ĵ
t (s), contra-
dicting the hypothesis that yĵ maximizes profits over Y ĵ.
Corollary. If (p, q; y = (yj)Jj=1; (x
i, θi)Ii=1) is a Radner equilibrium, then for every j, y
j is
coalition proof.
This corollary formalizes profit maximization as a firm objective consistent with share-
holder preferences when markets are incomplete and firm shareholders are changing over
time. As described above, the consistency of profit maximization can also be viewed from
the perspective of sequential shareholder evaluation, as follows. When presented with a
profit-maximizing production plan for firm j, yj = (yjt )
T
t=1, shareholders given by the share-
holding endowment unanimously approve yj1(s) as a production plan in period 1, state s, and
when presented with (yjt )
T
t=2, shareholders in period 2, state s unanimously approve y
j
2(s) as
a production plan in period 2, state s, and continuing in a similar manner, when presented
with (yjt )
T
t=t̂
, shareholders in period t̂, state s unanimously approve yj
t̂
(s) as a production
plan in period t̂, state s. This is true regardless of which state of the world is realized. In
this sense, a profit-maximizing production plan survives sequential shareholder evaluation
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along the equilibrium path.
It is noteworthy that the result presented above is independent of particular voting re-
quirements; that is, this result is independent of what share of the firm is required of a
coalition before it can affect firm decisions, and consequently, this result applies even when
shareholders with a small share of the firm can affect firm decisions.
3 Some Extensions
The consistency of profit maximization is shown above for the case where shareholders of
a particular firm in a particular period (and state) can form coalitions, and for the case
where shareholders have a claim on next period’s (same state’s) production plan. Both these
conditions can be relaxed, so that profit maximization remains a consistent firm objective
when shareholders of different firms in a particular period (and state) can form a coalition
across firms, and when shareholders in a firm in a particular period (and state) have a claim
to that period’s (and state’s) production plan, as follows.
Profit maximization remains a consistent firm objective when shareholders can form
coalitions across firms. This can be seen by an appropriate modification of the definition
of a coalition, and a re-formulation of production preferences of coalitions of shareholders
across firms, as follows.
Let y = (yj)Jj=1 be a production profile, and (x
i, θi)Ii=1 be a consumption and shareholding
profile, and for each firm j, period t, state s, let Sjt (s) be the collection of shareholders of
firm j in period t, state s, and Cjt (s) be a (possibly empty) firm j coalition in period t,
state s. A coalition in period t, state s is a non-empty union of firm coalitions in
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period t, state s, denoted Ct(s) =
⋃
j C
j
t (s). Let Ct̂(ŝ) be a coalition in period t̂, state ŝ,
let (ýj
t̂
(ŝ) : j satisfies Cj
t̂
(ŝ) 6= ∅) be a collection of production plans in period t̂, state ŝ,
and define Ct̂(ŝ) prefers (ý
j
t̂
(ŝ) : j satisfies Cj
t̂
(ŝ) 6= ∅) to (yj
t̂
(ŝ) : j satisfies Cj
t̂
(ŝ) 6= ∅),
if the production profile (ýj : j satisfies Cj
t̂
(ŝ) 6= ∅) formed by setting for every j such that
Cj
t̂
(ŝ) 6= ∅, ýjt (s) = ýjt̂ (ŝ) if t = t̂, and s = ŝ, and ý
j
t (s) = y
j
t (s) otherwise, is feasible, (that is,
for every j such that Cj
t̂
(ŝ) 6= ∅, ýj ∈ Y j,) and for every consumer-shareholder i ∈ Ct̂(ŝ), there
is a consumption plan x́i
t̂
(ŝ) in period t̂, state ŝ such that the production profile (ýj
t̂
(ŝ))Jj=1
in period t̂, state ŝ formed by setting ýj
t̂
(ŝ) = ýĵ
t̂
(ŝ) if j satisfies Cj
t̂
(ŝ) 6= ∅, and ýj
t̂
(ŝ) = yj
t̂
(ŝ)
otherwise, and the consumption profile (x́i
t̂
(ŝ))Ii=1 in period t̂, state ŝ formed by setting
x́i
t̂
(ŝ) = x́i
t̂
(ŝ) if i ∈ Ct̂(ŝ), and x́it̂(ŝ) = xit̂(ŝ) otherwise, together form an allocation in
period t̂, state ŝ, (that is,
∑I
i=1 x́
i
t̂
(ŝ) =
∑I
i=1 w
i
t̂
(ŝ) +
∑J
j=1 ý
j
t̂
(ŝ),) and for every consumer-
shareholder i ∈ Ct̂(ŝ), x́it̂(ŝ) ºit̂ (ŝ) xit̂(ŝ), and for some consumer-shareholder i ∈ Ct̂(ŝ),
x́i
t̂
(ŝ) Âi
t̂
(ŝ) xi
t̂
(ŝ). The first condition ensures that a candidate for a preferred collection of
production plans is feasible for every firm that has a shareholder in the coalition, the second
condition ensures that if the initial production and consumption profiles form an allocation in
a given period and state, then the candidate production and consumption profiles remain an
allocation in that period and state, and therefore, the candidate consumption and production
profiles form a re-distribution that affects at most shareholders in a coalition, and the third
condition ensures that nobody in the coalition is made worse off, and someone is made
strictly better off. For a coalition in period t, state s, Ct(s), a production profile (y
j)Jj=1 is
Ct(s)-proof if there is no (ý
j
t+1(s) : j satisfies C
j
t (s) 6= ∅) such that Ct(s) prefers (ýjt+1(s) :
j satisfies Cjt (s) 6= ∅) to (yjt+1(s) : j satisfies Cjt (s) 6= ∅). A production profile (yj)Jj=1 is
coalition proof if for every period t, state s, and for every coalition in period t, state s,
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Ct(s), (y
j)Jj=1 is Ct(s)-proof.
With this notation and terminology, the statement and proof of the lemma presented
above remain true. The first line in the statement of the theorem remains the same, and
the second line is modified to read, “If (yj)Jj=1 maximizes profits over (Y
j)Jj=1, then (y
j)Jj=1
is coalition proof.” Here (yj)Jj=1 maximizes profits over (Y
j)Jj=1 means that for every j, y
j
maximizes profits over Y j. The proof of the theorem needs obvious modifications; one
useful modification is to notice that in the last line, after “whence” the words “for some
ĵ such that C ĵt (s) 6= ∅” should be added. The corollary is then modified to state, “If
(p, q; y = (yj)Jj=1; (x
i, θi)Ii=1) is a Radner equilibrium, then (y
j)Jj=1 is coalition proof.”
Profit maximization remains a consistent firm objective with cum-dividend stock trading.
This can be seen by an appropriate modification of a consumer-shareholder’s budget set, and
the definition of coalition proof, as follows.
A consumer-shareholder’s budget set is modified as follows. For a price system (p, q), a
production profile y = (yj)Jj=1, and a consumption-shareholding plan (x
i, θi) for consumer-
shareholder i, the disposable income of i in period t, state s is
W i(p, q, y)t(s) = pt(s)w
i
t(s) + qt(s)θ
i
t−1(s) +
∑
j
θi,jt (s)pt(s)y
j
t (s).
In this setting, a θi,jt (s) shareholding by consumer-shareholder i in firm j in period t, state
s provides her with a θi,jt (s) share of profits of firm j in the same period t, state s, (and
she continues to receive a share of profits in future periods to the extent that she continues
shareholding in this firm.)14 A consumption-shareholding plan(xi, θi) is (p, q, y)-affordable for
consumer-shareholder i, if in every period t, state s, pt(s)x
i
t(s)+qt(s)θ
i
t(s) ≤ W i(p, q, y)t(s).
14Notice that for t = T , θi,jT (s) is identically 0, so a coalition (a non-empty subset of shareholders with
positive shareholding) is not defined. There are some obvious alternatives in this case; as qT (s) is also
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The budget set and demand set are now defined as in the previous section, as are the notion
of a Radner-GEI economy, and a Radner equilibrium.
Shareholder control is formalized with the same assumptions as in the previous section,
except that for the formal analysis, shareholders in a particular period who can credibly
affect the firm’s production plan in that period are the after-trade shareholders. (It is these
shareholders who receive firm profits in a given period.) To aid interpretation, this can
be viewed as stock-market trade at any moment before a shareholder meeting. Shareholder
control is exercised in a manner similar to that described in the previous section. Production
preferences of subsets of shareholders are formalized as above, but with the modification that
the collection of shareholders of firm j in period t, state s is given by Sjt (s) =
{
i
∣∣θi,jt (s) > 0
}
.
The remaining notation and terminology for coalition proof is unaffected. With this new
notation and terminology, the statement and proof of the lemma remain true. The statement
of the theorem remains the same, and it is proved with the obvious modification in the time
index for shareholdings. The corollary is unaffected.
It is easy to appropriately extend the result to the case where short sales in firm shares
are permitted, and when assets in addition to firm shares are available. Moreover, the
extensions mentioned above can also be combined to prove, for example, the consistency
of profit maximization with coalitions of shareholders across firms and with cum-dividend
stock trading.
identically zero, one alternative is to restrict the definition of coalition proof to t ≤ T −1; another alternative
is to restrict a firm’s planning horizon to T − 1, so that for every j, yjT (s) is identically zero.
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4 Conclusion
The analysis presented above shows that profit maximization can be consistent with share-
holder preferences and shareholder control in private ownership economies with incomplete
markets and sequential trade, in the sense that along the equilibrium path, in every time
period and state of the world, every coalition of a firm’s shareholders in that time period
and state of the world approves a profit-maximizing production plan. The intuition for this
result is similar to the intuition for the result for Arrow-Debreu economies; that is, a profit-
maximizing production plan provides a maximal extension of every consumer-shareholder’s
budget set in each period and state in which a consumer-shareholder can affect production
choices, and therefore, if a consumer-shareholder is optimizing over such a budget set, an-
other production plan cannot improve upon this outcome. The analysis here deduces the
consistency of profit-maximization by incorporating some basic implications of a relatively
realistic process of shareholder control, by deriving shareholder preferences for production
plans from more primitive consumer preferences, and by evaluating different production plans
using such shareholder preferences along any path that might be realized in equilibrium. The
result presented here applies to decentralized, private ownership economies with anonymous
stock market trade over time, and with firm ownership separate from control.
The analysis presented above shows that with profit maximization as a firm objective, firm
production over time can be consistently organized even when firm shareholders are changing
over time. In particular, with the given assumptions, this objective is unanimously supported
by a firm’s shareholders, it allows for a separation of ownership and control, thereby facilitat-
ing the anonymity and smooth operation of decentralized markets, and it does not require a
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firm manager to possess more analytical ability than a consumer-shareholder. Moreover, this
objective does not impose additional informational requirements that arise when firms max-
imize present value based on shareholder inter-temporal rates of substitution. Finally, this
objective helps provide a foundation for formulating a theory of the firm in economies with
incomplete markets; a theory based on primitives of shareholder preferences and shareholder
control that are to be necessarily satisfied in economies with private firm ownership.
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